04. surveillance of smartphones
tracking is zeer moeilijk te vermijden
- phone betalen met cash , anders is er een spoor naar jou
- aanschaf
- cash indien mogelijk , is niet altijd het geval
- er zijn security cameras, be wary of these
- buy a used phone
- get it in person, or ship it to an unusal adress (Postbox)
- sim card : prepaid met cash, indien wettelijk mogelijk : in Be niet , in NL (nog) wel
- abbonnement : met cash : is zeer onwaarschijnlijk - android os is op zich zelf reeds problematisch , tenzij de-googled
- type of phone
- appleID & googleID are matched to IMSI (serial nr of the sim card ) and EMEI (phone serial ID )
- credit cards, etc are being matched to your appleID & googleID
- iphone & android phone have build in wifi triangulation :
buid in the os / chip , cannot be turned of for apple or google android (wel met een de-googled android phone) - gps tracking : use flip phones for calling
- pre paid burner phones = not great , because all are android based , only safe if used only once and no trace of buying to you
- old blackberries
- Purism Librem 5 Linux Phone , ok for privacy & tracking , but will in itself not help against surveilleince
other problems apart from the phone itself
- government have immense resources
- voice fingerprint = even uniek als een vingerafdruk
- analysing your habbits : data patronen , who do you call ? , track your wife bijvb.
- techniques such as relationship mapping , etc
- stingray attacks : man in the middle attack tussen een beller en de tower { you <-> stingray spy device <-> your carrier }
- 5G : has beam forming antenna technology (laser focused location tracking )
- use of SIGINT :
- relationship mapping
- correlation of data : email / phone # / social media / etc
- zie tevens [[_ security/21. smartphones/1. smartphone a privacy nightmare/osint]] ,
zeer interessante info op
https://github.com/CellularPrivacy/Android-IMSI-Catcher-Detector
IMSI catcher is more or less stingray